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GUILT, INNOCENCE, AND DUE PROCESS OF PLEA
BARGAINING
DONALD A. DRIPPS*
PREVIEW: LONG WEEKEND
Begin with a melodramatic but illuminating thought experiment:
Suppose in some future dystopia you have the bad luck to be selec-
ted for a twisted game show titled Whats Your Call? In Whats
Your Call? the contestants loved ones are suspended over a vat of
boiling oil and the sadistic emcee offers the hapless contestant a
Sophies-like choice between dreadful alternatives. If the contestant
does not make the call in sixty seconds, the emcee pushes a button,
and the family falls to a horrible death before the eyes of the
contestant and of the television audience.
In your case, the emcee says: Say, friend, you look a little
stressed! Thats understandable, under the circumstances. What you
need is a little R&R. So well give you a choice between a long week-
end and a long vacation.
For your long weekend, weve reserved space at beautiful, scenic
Guantanamo Bay where youll be subjected to seventy-two hours of
enhanced interrogation. Yes, youll experience the whole spectrum
of modern techniques: Sleep deprivation! Simulated drowning!
Nonmedical rectal rehydration! Dont worry that if you choose the
long weekend theyll make you have second thoughts about your
choicethey may ask you some questions, but they wont give you
any chance to change your mind. You glance at your family and
glumly await your alternative.
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego Law School. This Article was
originally presented at the excellent symposium held at William & Mary Law School on
February 20, 2015 and benefitted greatly from the comments I received there. Errors are
mine.
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If, on the other hand, the emcee continues, you really need to
get away from it all, we can guarantee that youll never spend an-
other day at the office again. Weve reserved a space for you at a
typical American penitentiaryfor forty years! This will only mean
the complete termination of your previous life, an all but complete
separation from friends and family, and a dreary monotony enliven-
ed only by pruno on holidays, the occasional brutality of the staff,
and a regular schedule of sexual assault by your colleagues.
So, youve got a choice: the long weekend or the long vacation.
The emcee pauses for dramatic effect, then hits the button that
starts the giant sixty-second stopwatch. Dramatic music leads up to
the emcees standard tagline: WHATS YOUR CALL? 
* * *
The point of the thought experiment is not the difficulty of the
choice. Every person to whom I have presented the hypothetical has
chosen long weekend over long vacation. Torture and prison are
both bad, but even accounting for posttraumatic stress disorder and
deeply discounting the back end of long vacation, there is no real
question here. So, what is the point?
I assert with great confidence that no civilian criminal court in
the United States would admit a confession obtained during long
weekend, even in a prosecution for aggravated murder.1 With only
a little less confidence I assert that no civilian criminal court in the
United States would reject a guilty plea obtained to avoid long
vacation.2 But if our intuitions about long weekend being less
1. See, e.g., United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (If
the government is going to coerce a detainee to provide information to our intelligence agen-
cies, it may not use that evidenceor fruits of that evidence that are tied as closely to the
coerced statements as Abebes testimony would be hereto prosecute the detainee for a
criminal offense.). The precise issue in Ghailani was whether the testimony of a witness
identified by interrogating the accused could be admitted on the assumption that the
interrogation was coercive. Id. at 264. The government chose not to contest the coercion issue
and litigated the suppression motion on the theory that even if Ghailanis admissions were
coerced, the witness identified by those admissions should be allowed to testify because the
taint of the illegality had attenuated. Id. at 265. Judge Kaplans opinion rejecting the admissi-
bility of derivative evidence in the form of a live witness, in a terrorism case, substantiates
quite clearly the inadmissibility of the coerced admissions themselves.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Faris, 388 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2004) ([E]ven if Faris was
told that he could be sent to Guantanamo if he did not plead guilty, this would not undermine
2016] DUE PROCESS OF PLEA BARGAINING 1345
dreadful than long vacation are to be trusted, this seems back-
wards. The threat of forty-years imprisonment has more power to
induce cooperation than seventy-two hours of torment. So unless
there is some normative distinction between a confession and a
guilty plea, settled, workaday constitutional doctrine contradicts
itself.3
Either confessions obtained by torture should be admitted or
guilty pleas induced by threats that are worse than torture should
be forbidden. Weas a legal system and as a societyare not pre-
pared to countenance torture in ordinary criminal cases. The only
logical alternative is to reconsider the constitutionality of cata-
strophic plea consequences.
the voluntariness of his plea. Every guilty plea necessarily entails a choice among distasteful
options. For this reason, courts have held that a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary mere-
ly because it was entered to avoid harsh alternatives such as the death penalty, see Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50, 755 (1970); prosecution on additional charges, see
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978); or expulsion from the witness protection
program, see Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir.1995).) (footnote omitted)
(parallel citations omitted). We shall see in due course that the Faris courtsquite typi-
calreliance on Brady and Bordenkircher is misplaced. As a description of positive law, it is
practically standard.
3. Note just how bizarre the syllogism in Faris is when clearly articulated:
Major premise: The Supreme Court has approved pleas entered to avoid death (Brady) or dec-
ades of imprisonment (Bordenkircher). See Faris, 388 F.3d at 457-58 (citing Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50, 755 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65
(1978)).
Minor premise: Enhanced interrogation is less dreadful than death or life imprisonment.
Conclusion: A plea induced by the threat of enhanced interrogation is voluntary, even
though any confession obtained by those techniques would be considered coerced. This
Article changes the major premise to: The Supreme Court has held that convictions based
on confessions obtained by enhanced interrogation techniques violate due process. 
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INTRODUCTION
I make four related claims. First, I claim descriptively that since
the adoption of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences, prosecutorial charging decisions have become practically
dispositive of most criminal justice adjudications. Second, I identify
two normative problems with prosecutorial dominance: the system
inflicts too much punishment on the guilty, and it creates incentives
that induce rational innocent people to plead guilty. Third, I lodge
a legal claim: plea incentives that would make an innocent person
likely to plead guilty violate due process, both on principle and as
applied in the long line of the Supreme Courts coerced-confession
cases. Fourth, I propose a remedial structurethe defense plea
offerthat offers one image of what practical reform might look
like.
Part I traces how the 1980s system of, roughly speaking, four
pleas to every trial conviction devolved into the current system of
nineteen pleas to every trial. Legislatures chose to make huge in-
vestments in policing and corrections while economizing on the due
process component of meaningful hearings as gatekeepers between
the policing and the corrections. These developments set the stage
for my descriptive and normative claims about modern plea bar-
gaining.
Part II turns to legal doctrine. The standard view, both in the
Court and in the literature, holds that plea bargaining is not coer-
cive so long as the prosecution proposes sets of charges supported by
the evidence. Since the prosecutor has a right to bring either the
high set or the low set, the lower set proposed for sentence after a
guilty plea is an offer, not a threat, and an offer cannot coerce.
The standard view of plea bargaining is wrong. From a moral
point of view, the standard view is myopic. Because it focuses on the
two proposals the prosecutor makes, it is blind to both the de-
fendants rights to trial and to reliable adjudication, and it ignores
the dozens of alternative outcomes the prosecutor vetoes. From a
legal point of view, the standard view is circular. The constitutional
issue is whether plea bargaining can be coercive. To privilege the
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statutory law authorizing both outcomes proposed by the prosecutor
is to give the statutory law priority over the constitutional law.
To analyze the idea of a coercive plea bargain, the correct base-
line is not the framework of substantive but discretionary liabilities
set up by our superficially prolix and draconian penal codes. The
baseline should be set by the rights of an accused presumed to be
innocent in a modern context in which empirical evidence suggests
that presumption is at best imperfectly protected by the processes
of police investigation and prosecutorial screening. From that base-
line, current law tolerates what seems to be increasingly common:
plea offers that are functionally coercive.
Assessing trial penalties under the Self-Incrimination Clause is
problematic because the clause provides no baseline by which to
measure compulsion. Due process is another matter. The Supreme
Courts coerced confession cases have survived independently of
Miranda.4 The narrowest understanding of the coerced-confession
doctrine is that police pressures that might cause a false confession
violate due process. Yet, the pressures brought to bear by modern
prosecutors make the goldfish rooms and arc lights of the 1930s
seem nearly trivial by comparison.
The Supreme Court cases thought to distinguish catastrophic
trial penalties from coerced confessions involved convictions chal-
lenged either long after plea or after trial, rather than immediately
prior to pleas under protest. Such cases are distinguishable even if
we ignore dramatic changes in the legal ecology, which no thought-
ful jurist would ignore.
Part IV picks up the thread by proposing a remedial structure.
When the defense is confronted by a plea offer that is coercive ac-
cording to the innocent-person standard, the correct remedy is for
the defendant to plead guilty subject to a trial offerthat is, a rep-
resentation that the defendant would stand trial, at risk of some
reasonable penalty for failing to accept responsibility. If the court
were to grant the motion, it would dismiss in terrorem charges
andthe Constitution trumping all sentencing rulesset a limit on
the practical liability the defendant would face if convicted at trial.
4. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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A constitutional right against coercion cannot be waived under
the pressure of coercive threats. It follows that the right to object to
coercive threats may not be subjected to coercive retaliation. If the
proposed theory is sound, the prosecution could not make waiving
the right to advance a trial offer a condition of a plea bargain, nor
could the prosecution add charges or otherwise retaliate against a
defendant who advanced a trial offer.
The proposed trial offer system responds to one manifestation of
the current systems pathological reliance on executive discretion
the problem of the innocent accused placed in the position of having
no reasonable alternative but to plead guilty. The far more common
manifestation of executive hegemony is overpunishment. Sentences
effectively set by the executive are, unsurprisingly, higher than
those that prevailed when the courts played a more active role in
sentencing. Part IV closes by exploring the relationship between the
problems of rational innocence and overpunishment. Are they in
irreducible conflict? After all, plea offers can be made less coercive
by increasing the punishment on a plea to more closely resemble the
one that would follow conviction after a trial. In the end, the conflict
may not be real. If it turns out to be so, constitutional regulation of
coercive-charging threats against those claiming innocence is a
logical first step toward constitutional regulation of those admitting
guilt but disputing the measure of just desert.
From the perspective of criminal-justice insiders, the entire proj-
ect might well appear feckless, even daft. Indeed, even the proposal
of disclosing and memorializing the spread between the plea offer
and the trial threat sounds disconcerting. Yet, I urge the reader to
review carefully what I have said so far and to revisit the initial
shock effect when we conclude. Not one step in the argument is un-
supported by powerful empirical evidence or by powerful lines of
doctrinal authority. What I say is original only because the system
we have has made it seem so. All I do here is remind us of how our
principles are at odds with our practice, even when there is no
compelling necessity of hypocrisy.
Indeed, from a pragmatic point of view, a system with more judi-
cial oversight of prosecutorial charging decisions would, at worst,
move resources away from policing and corrections and toward the
adjudication function. Even those who see such a reallocation as a
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social cost might accept that cost as a matter of principle. Many oth-
er thoughtful observers might not see that reallocation as a social
cost at all.
I. CONTEXT
A. The Steroid Era in U.S. Criminal Justice
American sports fans remember the 1990s as Major League
Baseballs steroid era. During this period, the use of performance-
enhancing drugs led to massive physiques and more, and longer,
home runs.5 After a period of exhilaration, fans turned against the
players who had broken both league policy and federal criminal
law.6 Baseball still copes with the long-term damage players did to
themselves and the problem of assessing records achieved during
the now generally-reviled steroid era.7
This same period saw a steroid era in criminal justice. The sys-
tems executive musclepolice at the front end of the process and
corrections at the back endgrew rapidly. The resources devoted to
adjudicationjudges, prosecutors, and public defendersgrew very
little. In effect, the system splurged on crime control and scrimped
on due process.
To begin with policing: From 1992 ... to 2004, State and local law
enforcement agencies added about 230,400 full-time employees, in-
cluding 123,800 sworn officers and 106,600 nonsworn employees.
During this time the number of violent crimes ... nationwide de-
creased by more than 565,000.8 That amounts to a 27.2 percent
increase in overall employees and a 20.4 percent increase in the
number of sworn officers.9
5. GEORGEJ.MITCHELL, REPORT TO THECOMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OFAN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING
SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 71-72 (2007), http://files.mlb.com/mitch
rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9QJ-QH99].
6. Id. at 11-12.
7. See id. at SR-8.
8. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [BJS], U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE [DOJ],
NCJ 212749, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2004, at 3 (2007),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea04.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5YF-E4DV].
9. Id.
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Not only did law enforcement agencies deploy more officers, those
officers made more arrests than they had before. In 1980, police
made 9,703,181 arrests.10 In 2000, there were 13,980,297 arrests,
roughly 40 percent more than in 1980.11 During the 1990s, crime fell
sharply: the homicide rate per 100,000 population was 10.2 in 1980,
9.4 in 1990, and 5.5 in 2000.12
The higher arrest rate translated into more prosecutions. From
1987 to 2004, state criminal court filings rose by 67 percent.13 The
incarceration rate rose too, from 139 prisoners per 100,000 popula-
tion in 1980 to 292 in 1990 to 478 in 2000.14 So during a period of
falling crime rates, the number of prosecutions and the number of
prisoners per capita rose by roughly two-thirds.
The resources devoted to adjudicating criminal cases did not keep
up. From 1987 to 2004, [s]tate trial courts increased judicial staf-
fing by 11% overall, adding 2,600 judges in courts across the coun-
try.15 Between 1992 and 2001, the number of state prosecutors rose
39 percent.16 The systems neglected stepchild, indigent defense, has
not fared that well. From 1999 to 2007, public defender program
caseloads increased by 20% while staffing increased by 4%.17
An increasing reliance on guilty pleas enabled the system to cope
with caseloads that rose far faster than the resources for adjudica-
tion. In the federal system, [i]n 1980, one defendant went to trial
10. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [FBI], CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 200 (1981).
11. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 216 (2001).
12. FBI, State-by-State and National Crime Estimates by Year(s), UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING STAT., http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm [https://
perma.cc/DB66-WNVN] (last revised Mar. 29, 2010) (select United States-Total, Violent
crime rates, and the date range 1980 to 2000).
13. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BJS, DOJ, NCJ 217996, STATE COURT ORGA-
NIZATION, 1987-2004, at 2 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco8704.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B8PT-LSJG].
14. Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., Univ. at Albany, Persons under Correc-
tional Supervision: Table 6.29.2012, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT., http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t6292012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F9H-T9YT] (last updated 2013) [hereinafter
Hindelang Criminal Justice].
15. LANGTON & COHEN, supra note 13, at 2.
16. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BJS, DOJ, NCJ 193441, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001,
at 2 (2002), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY3B-JDTK].
17. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BJS, DOJ, NCJ 228229, STATE PUBLIC DE-
FENDERPROGRAMS,2007, at 18 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D38H-2Z4W].
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for every four who pled guilty. By 1999, that ratio fell to one in
twenty.18 However, defendants have a constitutional right to trial,
and under Jones v. Barnes they are not required to accept the advice
of counsel to plead guilty.19 How did the system induce defendants
to plead at much higher rates than had prevailed hitherto? Prosecu-
tors needed more leverage, and they got it.
The two key developments were sentencing guidelines and statu-
tory mandatory minimum sentences.20 The prosecutors selection of
the charges and ability to offer sentencing departures came to con-
trol the sentence imposed, so long as the prosecution could credibly
threaten conviction at trial.21 By charging possessory offenses that
could be established solely by officer testimonyproxy crimes such
as possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm
by a felonprosecutors could avoid the perils of civilian witnesses
susceptible to either threats or claims on loyalty. Absent judicial dis-
cretion over sentencing, which guidelines and mandatory minimums
curtailed, prosecutors could credibly threaten catastrophic conse-
quences based on charges that could be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt with officer testimony.
The discretionary power of state prosecutors is less complete but
still substantial. About half of the states have sentencing guidelines,
and all of them have mandatory minimums for some offenses.22 In
the state courts, guilty pleas account for 95 percent of felony convic-
tions.23
18. Irwin H. Schwartz, Consequences of the Disappearing Criminal Jury Trial, CHAMPION,
Nov. 2001, at 7.
19. 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
20. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85 (2005) (The federal system over the last three decades has
featured increasingly severe sentences, and the adoption of federal sentencing guidelines in
the late 1980s enhanced the power of prosecutors and judges to reward cooperation from de-
fendants. In those districts where prosecutors took full advantage of the tools available to
them under the sentencing laws, it became more expensive than ever for a federal defendant
to insist on a trial; fewer paid the price each year.).
21. See id. at 85-86.
22. See Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 479, 487-88 (2005).
23. Wright, supra note 20, at 90 n.36.
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B. Modern Plea Bargaining
In a great many cases, charge selection is not the beginning of an
adversarial process, but the outcome of the case, practically speak-
ing. Catastrophic trial penalties make the prosecutions plea offer
all but inevitable. For example, consider Graham v. Florida, which
held that life-without-parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment.24 The Supreme Court ca-
sually recited what is really a quite remarkable procedural history.25
Justice Kennedy reviewed the trial court proceedings as follows:
In July 2003, when Graham was age 16, he and three other
school-age youths attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in
Jacksonville, Florida.... The restaurant manager required stitch-
es for his head injury. No money was taken.
Graham was arrested for the robbery attempt. Under Florida
law, it is within a prosecutors discretion whether to charge 16-
and 17-year-olds as adults or juveniles for most felony crimes.
Grahams prosecutor elected to charge Graham as an adult. The
charges against Graham were armed burglary with assault or
battery, a first-degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and attempted
armed-robbery, a second-degree felony carrying a maximum pen-
alty of 15 years imprisonment.
On December 18, 2003, Graham pleaded guilty to both charg-
es under a plea agreement. Graham wrote a letter to the trial
court. After reciting this is my first and last time getting in
trouble, he continued Ive decided to turn my life around. ... 
The trial court accepted the plea agreement. The court with-
held adjudication of guilt as to both charges and sentenced
Graham to concurrent 3-year terms of probation. Graham was
required to spend the first 12 months of his probation in the
county jail, but he received credit for the time he had served
awaiting trial, and was released on June 25, 2004.26
Graham committed fresh crimes in violation of his probation, induc-
ing the judge to impose the previously suspended life-without-parole
24. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
25. Id. at 52-53.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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sentence.27 The Court went on to hold unconstitutional the impo-
sition of a life-without-parole sentence on a nonhomicide juvenile
offender.28
Focus, however, on the so-called plea bargain. The gap between
the prosecutions plea offer and trial threat was the difference be-
tween little more than time served and a life sentencefor a
teenage offender. As a legal matter, both life without parole and
three years of probation were permissible outcomes, and the choice
between them was voluntary.
Federal prosecutors have even more leverage than their state
counterparts. Federal judges are constrained by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.29 Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys offices have
discretion to charge violations of numerous statutes carrying man-
datory minimum sentences.30 One notorious example of this use of
mandatory minimums is United States v. Angelos.31
According to an informant, the defendant, Weldon Angelos, sold
eight ounces of marijuana to the informant on three occasions.32 The
informant saw a gun at two of these sales.33 Agents found addition-
al firearms at the homes of Angelos and of his girlfriend.34 Under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), carrying a firearm during and in relation to any
drug trafficking is subject to a mandatory five-year minimum
sentence for the first offense and a mandatory twenty-five year
minimum sentence for each subsequent offense, with probation
disallowed and all sentences to run consecutively.35
27. Id. at 54-57.
28. Id. at 82.
29. See generally U.S.SENTENCINGGUIDELINESMANUAL (U.S.SENTENCINGCOMMN 2015).
30. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys & Assistant At-
torney Gen. for the Criminal Div. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-
recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D8R-2RW6] (recognizing
attorney discretion and providing guidelines on when to refrain from triggering mandatory
minimum sentences).
31. See 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004).
32. Id. at 1231.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
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The U.S. Attorneys office charged three distribution counts, one
§ 924(c) count, and two lesser charges.36 The government told the de-
fense that:
[I]f he pled guilty to the drug distribution count and the § 924(c)
count, the government would agree to drop all other charges, not
supersede the indictment with additional counts, and recom-
mend a prison sentence of 15 years. The government made clear
to Mr. Angelos that if he rejected the offer, the government
would obtain a new superseding indictment adding several §
924(c) counts that could lead to Mr. Angelos facing more than
100 years of mandatory prison time.37
When the defendant refused to plead, the government then
obtained two superseding indictments, eventually charging twen-
ty total counts, including five § 924(c) counts which alone carried
a potential minimum mandatory sentence of 105 years.38 The
prosecution rebuffed subsequent defense efforts to reopen plea dis-
cussions, and after a trial, the jury convicted on sixteen counts,
including three § 924(c) charges.39
Angelos had no significant criminal history, so on the drug
chargesthe Guidelines prescribed a range of seventy-eight to ninety-
seven months.40 The § 924(c) mandatory minimums, however, added
fifty-five years (five years on the first count and twenty-five each
on the second and third counts, which the government added only
after the refusal to plead).41 With manifest reluctance Judge Cassell
rejected the defendants Eighth Amendment challenge to the sen-
tence.42 As of 2012, Weldon Angelos has an expected release date of
2051.43
Catastrophic trial penalties are not isolated incidents. John
Gleeson, a federal district judge in Brooklyn, New York, said
36. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 1231.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1232.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1256-60.
43. See Derek P. Jensen, Chaffetz Unveils Prison Program to Reduce Recidivism and
Lower Crime, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 31, 2013, 10:53 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/56385962
[https://perma.cc/9NL8-2AK8].
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[p]rosecutors routinely threaten ultraharsh, enhanced mandatory
sentences that no onenot even the prosecutors themselves
thinks are appropriate.44 A study by Human Rights Watch found
that:
[P]rosecutors often charge or threaten to charge mandatory min-
imums not because they result in appropriate punishment, even
in the view of the prosecutor, but to pressure defendants to plead
guilty and to punish them if they do not. The pressure they could
bring to bear on defendants led to soaring numbers of guilty
pleas in drug cases: from 1980 to 2010, the percentage of federal
drug cases resolved by a plea increased from 68.9 to 96.9
percent, where it remained in 2012.45
The study concluded that plea agreements, once a choice to
consider, have for all intents and purposes become an offer drug
defendants cannot afford to refuse.46
C. Two Practical Problems: Coercing the Innocent and Excessive
Punishment
The systems overriding evil is the concentration of power in
executive hands. The law determines who is to be punishedand
how severelyless than it empowers prosecutors to make these
determinations as they see fit. In 1981, Dean Vorenberg denounced
prosecutorial power as excessive, indeed as indecent.47 In the fol-
lowing decade, Congress adopted the Sentencing Guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences, dramatically augmenting prosecu-
torial power.48 Charge selection, which had been very important
before, became dispositive of most outcomes.
There are powerful reasons for supposing that if anyone is to have
arbitrary power of the scope now exercised by prosecutors, that
44. Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called Harsh, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2013, at A19 (quoting Judge Gleeson) (emphasis in original).
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CANT REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL PROSECU-
TORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 31 (2013) (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 2.
47. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1523-37 (1981) (arguing that the scope of prosecutorial discretion is unnecessarily broad and
that limitations are required to ensure the fair administration of justice).
48. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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power should be exercised by actors playing other institutional
rolesjudges or grand jurors, for example. The fundamental point
is one of political principle rather than policy. No one should hold
power to inflict decades of incarceration unconstrained by standards
or transparent accountability. Society would not stand for Assistant
U.S. Attorneys determining eligibility for Social Security benefits
unguided by standards and unpoliced by either publicity or legal re-
view. In the criminal process, graverfar graverconsequences
turn on the opaque and unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.
The bedrock principles of liberal democratic theory from which
the guilty plea system so grossly deviates are bedrock principles for
good reasons. When they are disregarded, it is only a matter of time
before government authority runs amok. In the plea bargaining con-
text we now see two terribly practical downsides to prosecutorial
hegemony.
First, the system prosecutors have dominated for the last thirty
years has become the most punitive in the world and indeed, if we
leave aside police states with camp systems, perhaps in history.
Second, the arbitrary power to threaten catastrophic conviction con-
sequences endangers the innocentnot only by confronting them
with irrational risks if they stand trial but also by creating incen-
tives to offer substantial assistance to prosecutors even if the
grounds of cooperation need to be invented.49
1. Overpunishment
Mass incarceration is a function of prosecutorial discretion. From
a policy standpoint, prosecutorsself-selected for self-righteousness
in the first placerespond to a set of mostly perverse incentives.
They are judged by convictions over a time horizon much shorter
than the consequences of their decisions.50 They do not internalize
the costs of incarceration, either institutionally or temporally. Coun-
ty-level prosecutors make most state charging decisions; the costs
49. Wright, supra note 20, at 85-86.
50. For an empirical study finding that prosecutors aim to maximize sentence severity in
their cases, see Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers
of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379 (2005).
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of imprisonment are borne by state-level corrections departments.51
The Federal Bureau of Prisons is included in the Department of
Justices budget, but most charging decisions are made by the U.S.
Attorneys office.52
Like many other seemingly unrelated problems, such as global
warming and the underfunding of public pensions, mass incarcera-
tion results in part from the long time horizon of the problem and
the short time horizon of public officials. Where is the interest group
vengefully tracking the charging decisions of 1990s Assistant Dis-
trict Attorneys, with an eye to contributing funds to defeat their
senatorial bids? Should, however, a current official take responsibil-
ity for the early release of geriatric prisoners, each released prisoner
could become a headline tomorrow by committing some horrible
crime.
The incentive structure predicts what we see in practice: mass
incarceration. Prosecutors became dominant with the adoption of
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums in the mid-1980s.
Between 1980 and 2000, the system became dramatically more
punitive. Using the per capita prison populationstate and fed-
eralas a measure of overall punishment and the per capita
frequency of homicide as a proxy for crime generally, we can
calculate an index of how much punishment per unit of crime the
system is inflicting. Here are the ratios at ten-year intervals from
1960 to 2000:53
51. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1239, 1259 (2012) (Prosecutors are county officials, but the state pays to incarcerate
the defendants they convict; we should thus expect prosecutors to overuse prison beds, since
neither they nor their constituents bear the full cost.).
52. See DOJ, FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST: PRISONS AND DETENTION, http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/01/30/4._prisons_and_detention_fact_sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E5LU-JLYU].
53. MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, BJS, DOJ, NCJ 102529,HISTORICAL CORRECTIONSSTA-
TISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984, at 32 (1986); Hindelang Criminal Justice, supra
note 14; FBI, supra note 12.
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Table 1: Per Capita Prisoner-to-Homicide Ratio by Year
Year Per Capita
Prisoner-to-
Homicide Ratio
Percentage
1960 119/5.1 (23.3)
1970 97/7.9 (12.28)
1980 139/10.2 (13.6)
1990 292/9.4 (31.1)
2000 478/5.5 (86.9)
Figure 1 gives a visual impression of how the national numbers
changed. There was a sharp decline during the 1960s, a gradual
increase from 1970 through 1990, and a somewhat faster rise from
1990 to 2000 as prison population continued its growth trend while
the homicide rate fell by almost half.
Figure 1: Per Capita Prisoner-to-Homicide Ratio
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Many factors are at work. If, however, as most agree, prosecutors
have exercised the most influence on outcomes since the 1980s, we
should either applaud mass incarceration or think about reducing
the scope of prosecutorial power.54
2. Coercion of the Innocent
Now we turn to the innocence problem. As of March 20, 2016, the
University of Michigan Law Schools National Registry of Exonera-
tions listed 272 false convictions obtained by plea.55 That number
grows continually;56 Judge Rakoff observed that [b]arely a month
goes by without someone who pled guilty being exonerated and
released from prison.57 Unlike innocent suspects who falsely con-
fess after waiving Miranda, defendants who plead guilty are all but
invariably represented by counsel.58 The innocent who plead guilty
made a rational calculation.
In a recent article, John Blume and Rebecca Helm carefully laid
out the incentive structure that induces innocent people to plead
guilty.59 Their analysis distinguishes three types of cases.60 First,
54. See John Pfaff, The Flawed NRC Report: The Mysterious Case of the Missing Prosecu-
tor, Part 1, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 30, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2014/05/the-flawed-nrc-report-the-mysterious-case-of-the-missing-prosecutor-part-1.
html [https://perma.cc/9GZX-94WP] ([B]etween 1994 and 2008, the probability that an arrest
would result in a felony filing rose from 0.387 to 0.57, an increase of 54%. During the same
time, the probability a felony case would result in a prison admission was flat at 0.26. In other
words, growth is driven almost entirely by an increase in felony filings. This solves the who
question that the reports analysis cant answer: growth is driven almost entirely by the pros-
ecutor. Once a felony case is filed, the defendant is no more likely to go to prison in 2008 than
in 1994. But the probability that an arrestee finds himself confronting a felony charge soars.)
(footnote omitted).
55. The National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF
9EA7}&FilterField1=Group&FilterValue1=P [https://perma.cc/8HUK-6YVU] (last visited Mar.
20, 2016).
56. Between December 18, 2014 and March 20, 2016, the list of false convictions obtained
by plea grew from 162 to 272. Id.; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Reply to Plea Bargains & Prosecutors:
An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2014/dec/18/plea-bargains-prosecutors-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/C2WJ-86TJ].
57. Rakoff, supra note 56.
58. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012).
59. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent De-
fendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 172-80 (2014).
60. Id.
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defendants falsely charged with minor crimes may find it in their in-
terest to terminate punishment-by-process as quickly as possible.61
A repeat, low-level offender may be in pretrial detention and grate-
ful to accept an offer of time served on a false charge given that,
with his record, the collateral consequences of another conviction
are almost wholly redundant.62 For substance abusers, a deal that
offers entry into a treatment program may be a better life choice
than contesting a false charge.63 Those falling just above eligibility
for indigent defense may fear the cost of retaining counsel through
the trial process.64
Blumes and Helms second category covers defendants who settle
with prosecutors after winning a remand for new trial through the
appellate process.65 Important as it is for all concerned in such
cases, these are, from a systemic perspective, extremely rare.66 The
accused must first be one of the one-in-twenty defendants who elects
trial rather than plea, and then lose at trial but win on appeal.67
Their third category covers cases where the plea/trial differen-
tial is so catastrophic that a rational person would not rely on the
trial process to prevent the catastrophe.68 Compared with the first
category, the third category occurs less frequently because pretrial
detention on minor charges is far more common than a very wide
spread between the plea offer and the trial threat.69 But it covers
a large number of cases, far more than in Blumes and Helms
second category.70 How many innocent defendants would reject the
plea offered to Terrance Graham or to Weldon Angelos?71 If the
61. See id. at 173-74.
62. Id. at 174.
63. James Barron, JetBlue Flight Attendant Accepts Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM
(Oct.19, 2010, 1:54 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/jetblue-flight-attendant
-accepts-plea-deal/ [https://perma.cc/67GQ-4U7V] (describing a case where the defendant ac-
cepted a plea deal that required him to participate in mental health counseling and substance
abuse treatment).
64. Blume & Helm, supra note 59, at 174.
65. See id. at 175.
66. Id. at 175 n.109.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 180.
69. See id. at 173.
70. Id. at 175 n.109.
71. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (Graham avoided a life without parole
sentence and received a sentence of three years probation by pleading guilty); supra notes 31-
41 and accompanying text (Angelos risked more than 100 years of mandatory prison time by
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defendant making that choice was your child and asserted to your
face his innocence, what advice would you give?
There is a related risk to the innocent posed by the prosecutorial
power to threaten catastrophic consequences. Ruthless plea bar-
gaining can assist criminal investigations by offering low-level
gangsters the choice between cooperating or suffering sentences
out of proportion to any rational assessment of blame or harm.72
Empirical evidence confirms the role of dishonest informants in
bringing about wrongful convictions.73
The confirmed cases of false guilty pleas surely represent the tip
of the iceberg.74 Those in Blumes and Helms first category quit
fighting. Those in their third category make the false plea for good
reasons and ordinarily will keep mum thereafter. It is worth recal-
ling the statistics on pretrial DNA testing. Pretrial DNA testing, as
of the 1990s, exonerated about a quarter of the suspects tested.75 If
asserting his right to trial).
72. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12
(2010) ([T]he possibility of a long sentence provides a powerful incentive for members of a
criminal group to provide information to law enforcement and to assist in the prosecution of
other offenders.).
73. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 107-08 (2006) (Horror stories abound of lying
jailhouse snitches and paid informants who frame innocent people in pursuit of cash or le-
nience for their own crimes.). One study Natapoff examined traced 45.9 percent of wrongful
convictions in capital cases to false testimony by informants. Id. at 107.
74. Few cases of false guilty pleas are in the public record. See Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533
(2005) ([A] large number of false convictions in non-capital cases are never discovered
because nobody ever seriously investigates the possibility of error.). But when incidents are
confirmed, multiple guilty pleas are impugned. Large scale investigations have uncovered
more systematic acts of deliberate dishonesty than mistakes that exonerate a single defen-
dant. Id. at 536-37. Gross states:
Only twenty of the exonerees in our database pled guilty, less than six percent
of the total: fifteen innocent murder defendants and four innocent rape defen-
dants who took deals that included long prison terms in order to avoid the risk
of life imprisonment or the death penalty, and one innocent defendant pled
guilty to gun possession to avoid life imprisonment as a habitual criminal. By
contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-nine Tulia defendants pled guilty to drug of-
fenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the 100 or more exonerated
defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles.
Id. at 536.
75. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NATL INST. OF JUSTICE, DOJ, NCJ 161258, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at xix, 20, 78 (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4NF-N8P8].
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that number has changed, I have seen no report of it. The implica-
tion is that when a police investigation has identified a prime
suspect in cases important enough to do a DNA test (that was then
even more extraordinary and expensive than now), a fourth of the
time the police investigation was wrong. The police investigation
will be less painstaking in the first category and under more pres-
sure to produce a result in the third category.
Of course, if the trial process were perfect, the prosecutors threat
to the innocent would be in vain. The trial exoneration cases dem-
onstrate that the trial process is far from perfect.76 Given what Dan
Simon aptly terms the limited diagnosticity of criminal trials, a
rational person choosing between decades in prison and a shorter
time served for a crime he did not commit will choose the latter.77
The empirical evidence confirms the phenomenon of innocent people
pleading guilty; the extent of the phenomenon remains unknown.78
The current degree of concentration of power in prosecutorial
hands is wrong on principle. The departure from otherwise gener-
ally accepted legal and political principles has led to at least two
disturbing practical consequencesmass incarceration and pressure
on the innocent to enter false pleas.79 In the rest of this Article, I fo-
cus on plea bargainings innocence problem. At the end I consider
whether constitutional law to prevent coercion might turn out to be
part of the solution to the distinct overpunishment problem.
76. DNA exonerations have produced an extensive literature. See generally BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:WHERECRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GOWRONG (2011); JIM
PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE: EIGHT MYTHS THAT CONVICT THE INNOCENT (2010);
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012).
77. See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143,
218 (2011) (noting that 90 percent of people imprisoned for felonies plead guilty, despite the
fact that the evidence in many cases was limited and uncertain).
78. On guilty pleas by the innocent, see, for example, Russell D. Covey, Mass Exoneration
Data and the Causes of Wrongful Convictions (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1881767 [https://perma.cc/SN98-KTWE]. A recent psychological experiment found
that more than half of the innocent student-subjects were willing to admit wrongdoing in
exchange for lenience. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendants
Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargainings Innocence Problem, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34 (2013).
79. See supra Part I.C.
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II. PLEA BARGAINING AS TORTURE
In a classic article, John Langbein drew a disturbingly close an-
alogy between American plea bargaining and juridical torture in
renaissance Europe.80 I claim here that extreme trial penalties are
not just analogous to coerced confessions, but they are constitu-
tionally indistinguishable. If we agree that the long weekend is
preferable to the long vacation, then plea bargaining cannot be
distinguished from torture on the basis of behavioral pressure.81
What other bases of distinction might be offered? We begin with the
Supreme Courts involuntary confessions cases and then turn to
consider whether plea bargaining can be distinguished by a dif-
ferent normative baseline for measuring coercion.
A. The Due Process Doctrine Prohibiting Coerced Confessions
The fountainhead of the coerced confession cases is Brown v.
Mississippi, the infamous flogging case decided in 1936.82 At that
time, two different legal doctrines applied to the practice of ex-
trajudicial interrogation. First, a common law rule of evidence
prohibited the introduction of statements obtained by threats or
promises.83 The common law rule was predicated on the risk of
convicting the innocent based on false admissions.84 Second, the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination authorized a
witness to claim privilege rather than answer incriminating ques-
tions.85
80. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (1978).
81. See supra Preview.
82. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
83. See, e.g., Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101, 166-67 (1992) (Although a few courts occasionally submitted questionable con-
fessions to juries, after 1810 it was a firmly accepted common law rule of evidence in the
United States that a confession was inadmissible if obtained by a promise or threat.) (foot-
notes omitted).
84. See id. at 168 (Why were confessions excluded under this rule? Although many of the
early cases ignored this question, it is clear that the overriding concern, as under the English
rule, was that a confession might be false if induced by promises or threats.) (footnote omit-
ted).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Herman, supra note 83, at 163-64 (After the Revolution,
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Neither doctrine was helpful to the petitioners in Brown. The
highest authority on the common law of evidence in Mississippi was
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, not the Supreme Court of the
United States. And precedent blocked any application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to state proceedings; in Twining v. New Jer-
sey, the Court had held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
incorporate the Fifth Amendment privilege.86
In Brown, the Supreme Court reversed on due process grounds.87
The Due Process Clause, at a very high level of generality, allows
the government to injure individuals only after a fair hearing has
determined that the injury is authorized by pre-existing law.88
Coerced confessions might violate this general rule-of-law guarantee
in different ways.
First, the torture might violate due process at the time inflicted,
even if there is no subsequent charge or trial. It might be that in-
vestigatory torture violates the natural law strand in the legality
criterion, that is, substantive due process. Alternatively, pretrial
torture might be condemned for offending the fair hearing require-
ment by inflicting punishment without charge or trial. Second, the
use of admissions obtained by force might violate the legality cri-
terion by becoming complicit in the pretrial torture. Or the use of
coerced admissions might offend the fair hearing requirement by
permitting a decision based on unreliable evidence.
The brief opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, for the unanimous
Court, is emphatic but elusive. It must be read quite carefully to
tease out the precise way in which the convictions were obtained in
violation of due process. The opinion does not state that the whip-
ping by the deputies violated due process at the moment it was
committed.89 It likewise does not state that there was no consti-
tutional violation before the trial.90 Brown is simply silent on the
constitutionality of the flogging itself.91
the protection against compulsory self-incrimination took on a new dimension. Previously a
common law right, it became constitutionalized.).
86. 211 U.S. 78, 90 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
87. Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
88. See, e.g., Peter Strauss, Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/due_process [https://perma.cc/K7RK-VUEE] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
89. See generally Brown, 297 U.S. at 278.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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The opinion locates the due process violation in the convictions
based on the coerced confessions:
The State may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction
under mob dominationwhere the whole proceeding is but a
maskwithout supplying corrective process. Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 91. The State may not deny to the accused the aid
of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. Nor may a State,
through the action of its officers, contrive a conviction through
the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of
depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception
of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
perjured. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112. And the trial
equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have
contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained
by violence. The due process clause requires that state action,
whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Loui-
siana, 272 U.S. 312, 316. It would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken
to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sen-
tence was a clear denial of due process.92
Just as the mob-dominated show trials in Moore v. Dempsey, the
constructive denial of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, and the delib-
erate introduction of perjury in Mooney v. Holohan tainted the trials
so completely that the proceedings were nullities, just so the use of
the confessions voided the convictions in Brown.93
But if Brown is clear about when the violation occurred, it
equivocates about whether the violation involved the legality criteri-
on or the fair hearing requirement. The analogies to mob-dominated
trials and state-sanctioned perjury suggest the problem was the
unreliability of the evidencethat due process instantiated the com-
mon law evidence rule. The references to fundamental principles
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id.
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invoke the substantive due process understanding of the legality
criterion.94
The post-Brown coerced confessions cases made clear that the
due process standard of voluntariness incorporated the common
laws concern for trustworthy evidence. Justice Jackson wrote for
the Court in Stein v. New York that:
Coerced confessions are not more stained with illegality than
other evidence obtained in violation of law. But reliance on a co-
erced confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession
combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with
what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive
evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for any convic-
tion, while evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, wire
tapping, or larceny may be and often is of the utmost verity.95
94. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756-65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(describing and defending substantive, as distinct from procedural, due process).
95. 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953). In Stein, the state procedure relied on the jury to determine
whether the confessions were voluntary. Id. at 159-60, 170. After holding that if there was
even a chance that the jury might have credited a confession that was in fact unconstitu-
tionally coerced, reversal was required, the Court held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury that it must return a verdict of acquittal if it found the con-
fessions to be coerced. Id. at 188, 192-93. If even a chance existed that the jury credited a
confession that was in fact unconstitutionally coerced, reversal was required, but the Court
found the confessions in the instant cases voluntary. Id. at 192-94. In a subsequent case, the
Court held that due process required a judicial determination of the voluntariness of a con-
fession by a body other than that which was trying the defendant. See Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
One clear indicator of the continuing role of the reliability rationale is a line of circuit court
cases holding coerced confessions inadmissible against third parties, generally on the ground
that the third party has a right to exclude unreliable evidence. See United States v. Sorenson,
2009 WL 118057, at *1 (9th Cir. 2009) (Generally, a defendant does not have standing to
challenge a violation of [a third partys] rights; however, illegally obtained confessions may
be less reliable than voluntary ones, and thus using a coerced confession at anothers trial can
violate due process.) (citation omitted); United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th
Cir. 2005) (It is clear that Dowell does have standing to challenge the voluntariness of a
witnesss confession. In doing so, however, Dowell is not seeking to vindicate the witnesss
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but instead is seeking to protect his own
right to due process; that is, to a fair trial.) (citations omitted); Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d
1147, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 1997) (Consequently, because the evidence is unreliable and its use
offends the Constitution, a person may challenge the governments use against him or her of
a coerced confession given by another person.); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Confessions wrung out of their makers may be less reliable than voluntary
confessions, so that using one persons coerced confession at anothers trial violates his rights
under the due process clause.); LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1974) (Since
a statement coerced from an accused is neither less trustworthy than one from a witness nor
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Other cases went further and held that coerced confessions must be
excluded even if they are corroborated by independent evidence.96
Reliability, however, was the irreducible core of the voluntariness
standard, even though the standard swept more broadly.
The due process test incorporated the common law rule but went
further, requiring confessions to be made voluntarily in the totality
of the circumstances.97 This fuzzy, substantive due process add on
suffered the great defect of uncertainty. The Court has never ar-
ticulated the necessary and sufficient conditions of a voluntary
confession, nor has it ever prohibited specific tactics, as by setting
time limits or banning good cop/bad cop questioning. Dissatisfaction
with the voluntariness rubric led to Miranda.98 Despite Miranda,
however, the Court never abolished the voluntariness test but has
instead applied the due process doctrine in post-Miranda cases.99
more offensive to societys sense of fairness, it would seem illogical invariably to require a
Jackson hearing in the first case but never in the second.) (footnote omitted); Bradford v.
Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ([T]he use of knowingly coerced incrim-
ination of another is so patently untrustworthy that it rivals the knowing use of perjured
testimony.), aff d, 476 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
96. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (Use of involuntary verbal
confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their
unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements
contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the
communitys sense of fair play and decency.). As Professor Primus concluded in a recent
study:
The first strand of voluntariness is concerned with police actions that are judged
to be inherently bad, regardless of the effects that those actions have on sus-
pects. The second concerns police actions that are bad because they tend to cause
suspects to give unreliable confessions. In moral philosophers terms, the first
form is deontological and the second is consequentialist.... Properly understood,
modern confession doctrine still houses both of these concerns.
Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test,
114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2015).
97. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963) ([W]hether the confession was
obtained by coercion or improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of
all of the attendant circumstances. Haynes undisputed testimony as to the making and sign-
ing of the challenged confession used against him at trial permits no doubt that it was
obtained under a totality of circumstances evidencing an involuntary written admission of
guilt.) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
98. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
99. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991) (holding that the confession was
coerced and not harmless under harmless error analysis); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
398, 401-02 (1978) (holding that statements were coerced in violation of due process and could
not be admitted to impeach subsequent trial testimony).
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Even when the suspect has executed a valid Miranda waiver, the
post-waiver interrogation is still subject to the due process test.100
B. The Baseline Problem: Plea Deals as Coerced Confessions
If we consult the philosophical literature on coercion, we may
sympathize with the evasive nature of the jurisprudence.101 The
standard modern view emerged only with Alan Wertheimers
Coercion in 1987.102 On that view, coercion refers to threats (in a
technical sense) that would induce compliance from any reasonable
person.103 Wertheimer distinguishes threats from offers by whether
the inducers proposal makes the inducee worse off rather than
better off.104 Wertheimer then posits a moralized or normative
baseline for determining worse or better off.105 Only if the inducer
acts wrongly does he threaten, rather than make an offer to, the
inducee.106 If the threat would overcome the will of a reasonable
person, it is coercive.107
Wertheimer devoted a chapter to plea bargaining, concluding
that plea bargaining is not coercive because the prosecutor has a
right to bring either set of charges.108 It follows that the prosecutors
proposal is an offer, not a threat. Abusive interrogation methods, by
contrast, violate the legal and moral duties of the interrogators.
Only threats can coerce, so plea bargaining is not coercive. The
Supreme Courts plea bargaining cases, reviewed in the next Part,
are not inconsistent with this view and are widely seen to support
100. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1985) (holding that when the defendant
challenged his post-Miranda-waiver admission as coerced, the voluntariness of the confession
was a question of law on which the federal habeas court had a duty to decide without defer-
ring to the state court conclusion).
101. For an overview of the philosophical literature, see Scott Anderson, Coercion, in STAN-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2015), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/coercion/ [https://perma.cc/96B6-JUMP].
102. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).
103. Id. at 204.
104. See id. at 204, 222 ([T]he coerciveness of proposals is all in the baseline. And relative
to that baseline, only threats are coercive.). 
105. Id. at 206-11.
106. See id. at 220-21.
107. See id. at 204.
108. Id. at 122-43.
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it.109 So this account of plea bargains as noncoercive offers is the
standard view.
The standard view is plausible, but in my view mistaken, for two
reasons. First, the standard view is, from a moral perspective,
myopic. It focuses on the prosecutors right to bring any charge sup-
ported by the evidence. What, however, about the rights of the
defendant? Second, the standard view is circular. It rejects a consti-
tutional challenge to prosecutorial discretion by stipulating the
legality of prosecutorial discretion.
1. The Standard View is Myopic
The standard view is distinctly one-sided. Assuming the prosecu-
tor has a legal right of plenary discretion, it then subordinates the
defendants rights to the tactical exercise of that discretion. It would
be a mistake, however, to set the baseline of coercion as any set of
charges the prosecutor has probable cause to prefer. In the first
place, the prosecutorial office includes authority to decline to prose-
cute in some cases in which probable cause is manifest, as in an
assault case supported by one side in a swearing contest. The ABA
Standards for the Prosecution Function set out an illustrative list
of seven different scenarios in which not prosecuting at all may be
appropriate, despite the presence of probable cause.110 Even when
109. See infra Part III.C.
110. See ABA CRIMINALJUSTICESECTIONSTANDARDS,PROSECUTIONFUNCTION 3-3.9, http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_
standards_pfunc_blk.html [https://perma.cc/8RZ9-2ZMQ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause
consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that
sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative or
the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her
discretion are:
(i) the prosecutors reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the
particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
Id.
2016] DUE PROCESS OF PLEA BARGAINING 1371
the prosecutor decides to go forward, [t]he prosecutor should not
bring or seek charges greater in number of degree than can reason-
ably be supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary to
fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.111
Justice Powells dissent in Bordenkircher v. Hayes took an ap-
proach similar to the ABA Standards approach that charges ought
to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.112 Justice Powell thought
that the question to be asked under the circumstances is whether
the prosecutor reasonably might have charged respondent under the
Habitual Criminal Act in the first place.113 Justice Powell, however,
perhaps mindful of the difficulties in applying the totality of the
circumstances test in the confessions cases, quickly added that
deference to prosecutorial discretion would require treating tac-
tically-motivated overcharging ex ante as largely unreviewable.114
Powells fellow dissenters, Brennan and Marshall, who joined
Blackmuns dissent, saw the same problem.115 The prospect of, in
effect, applying the confession cases totality of the circumstances
template to the enormous majority of cases disposed of by guilty
pleas should rightly give us pause.
However, within the due process test is a narrower and more de-
terminate baseline. The accused has no right to one set of charges
or another, but he does have a right to a reliable adjudication of
guilt. Wertheimer acknowledges that although plea bargaining may
not be coercive on his account, it may be nevertheless morally in-
defensible because it may convict too many innocent persons.116
Arguably, the innocent person should be the one to choose between
the alternatives of plea and trial on terms set by the prosecutor. A
defendant might say, however, in substance, Im innocent, and I
want to stand trial but not at the risk of this Kafkaesque trial pen-
alty. The standard view is blind to the possibility of third options.
111. Id. at 3-3.9(f).
112. 434 U.S. 357, 370-72 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 370.
114. Id. at 370, 371 n.2.
115. See id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The Courts holding gives plea bargaining
full sway despite vindictiveness. A contrary result, however, merely would prompt the aggres-
sive prosecutor to bring the greater charge initially in every case, and only thereafter to
bargain.). 
116. WERTHEIMER, supra note 102, at 142-43.
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2. The Standard View is Circular
The standard view has another problem. From a legal perspec-
tive, the standard view is circular. Where is it written down that the
prosecutor can bring any charge the evidence supports for the pur-
pose of discouraging trials?117 And even if there were a statutory
authorization, the issue here is whether the trial penalty violates
the Constitutions Due Process Clause. We cannot answer the issue
under the higher law according to a baseline set by inferior law.
To be concrete, suppose in Brown that a state statute authorized
police officers to flog suspects during interrogation.118 If Mississippi
law authorized the flogging of suspects, flogging suspects would not
be coercive in Mississippi because, relative to a baseline that per-
mits flogging, the suspects are not made worse off. To say that the
prosecutor has a right to bring any charge supported by the evi-
dence is to assert a parallel conclusion.
Nor would it help for the statute to provide a right to counsel
during flogging. Suppose that, pursuant to such a statute, Deputy
Dial is whipping suspect Ed Brown in the Kemper County jailbut
in the presence of an appointed lawyer. The lawyer gives very pro-
fessional advice: Ed, everybody eventually breaks, so just tell them
whatever they want, and well move to suppress before trial. Does
the presence of counsel then mean that the suppression motion
loses?
In the context of both plea bargains and interrogations, the
baseline problem poses obvious problems. We cannot use subconsti-
tutional positive law as the baseline because that would be circular.
But what baseline should we use? The confessions cases were notor-
iously vague. Implicit in the coerced confession cases was a baseline
117. On the contrary, the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the
exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights. United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S.
598, 608 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962)) and citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 273 (1982)). If the prosecutor
admits to bringing charges because the accused exercised protected statutory and consti-
tutional rights the prosecution would be dismissed as unconstitutional, notwithstanding
probable cause. The issue is just what constitutional limits ought to constrain prosecutorial
discretion, not whether there should be no limits at all. It follows that plenary discretion
should not set the legal baseline.
118. See supra Part II.A.
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determination that an arrest followed by hours of secret questioning
imposed a morally permissible degree of behavioral pressure but
that any significant additional quantum of pressure as by beat-
ings, sleep deprivation, or involuntary druggingcrossed the line.119
The narrowest understanding of the confessions test treated coerced
confessions as unconstitutional because they are unreliable.120
Perhaps we can transpose that version of the confessions test to the
plea bargaining context.
3. The Innocence Baseline
The accused may have no legal or moral right against a charge on
the high side of the range, but he does have a legal and moral right
to a factually reliable adjudication of guilt. The Brown Court con-
demned the flogging as revolting to the sense of justice and a
clear denial of due process.121 But Chief Justice Hughes also point-
edly analogized coerced confessions to mob-dominated kangaroo
courts, knowing use of police perjury, and constructive denial of
counselpractices that are offensive primarily, if not solely, because
they risk miscarriages of justice.122 And the Brown opinion carefully
condemned not flogging in the abstract but quite precisely con-
demned basing convictions on admissions so obtained.123
From the perspective of procedural rather than substantive due
process, the issue is not whether the prosecutor has a right to seek
a conviction on the higher charges. The issue is whether the gap be-
tween the plea and the trial outcomes is wide enough to undermine
the reliability of any plea so induced. Procedural due process im-
poses no restraint on a prosecutor seeking a maximum sentence in
a no-offer case other than the requirement of winning a conviction
at a fair trial before the court imposes a sentence. A trial penalty
great enough to induce a rational innocent person to plead guilty is
quite different.
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. See Blume & Helm, supra note 59, at 161-62 (describing the factors that may coerce
innocent defendants to plead guilty).
121. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Reorienting our thinking about plea bargaining in terms of guilt
and innocence raises further questions. When can particular plea
deals be characterized as coercive in the technical sense suggested
here? That in turn looks not only to the facial difference between the
sentence likely on a plea and on a conviction after trial but also to
the confidence we have in the trial acquitting the factually innocent,
a matter on which we have a great deal of data from the DNA exon-
erations. Then, assuming we have a functional model of a coercive
plea deal, how can the claim of coercion be raised when the evil to
be remedied is precisely that the defendant (whether guilty or in-
nocent) rationally wants the deal compared to the prosecutors
terms for a potential trial? Before we take up the complications
posed by the proposed doctrinal turn, let us first consider the pre-
vailing view that any such turn is blocked by precedentto wit,
Brady v. United States and Bordenkircher v. Hayes.
III. BLOCKED BY PRECEDENT?
The Supreme Court did not consider cases raising issues about
plea bargaining until the 1970s. These early cases are widely cited
for the proposition that the prosecutor may add or subtract any
charge supported by the evidence as an incentive to plead guilty.
This Part closely examines those cases and finds that they stand for
no such sweeping proposition.
A. The No Jury, No Death Trilogy: Brady, Parker, and Alford
In Brady v. United States, Brady and an alleged accomplice were
indicted in 1959 for violating the Federal Kidnapping Act.124 That
Act, sometimes referred to as the Lindbergh Act, included 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a):
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce, any
person who has been unlawfully ... kidnaped ... and held for
ransom ... or otherwise ... shall be punished (1) by death if the
kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the
verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment
124. 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970).
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for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not
imposed.125
Since the kidnapping victim had been raped, and thus not released
unharmed, the defendants potentially faced the capital penalty if
they pleaded not guilty and elected jury trial.126
After his accomplice turned government witness, Brady pleaded
guilty and received a sentence of fifty years imprisonment.127 The fif-
ty years was later reduced to thirty by executive clemency.128 In
January 1967, about eight years into Bradys thirty-year term, the
Federal District Court of Connecticut dismissed a § 1201(a) count in
an indictment against Charles Jackson on the ground that exposing
only defendants who elect jury trial to the risk of execution was un-
constitutional.129
Brady then sought habeas corpus relief as a federal prisoner
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that his guilty plea was involun-
tary.130 Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld the district courts
constitutional ruling in Jackson but held that the death penalty
clause was severable.131 The district court denied Bradys § 2255 pe-
tition after an evidentiary hearing at which the accomplice and the
lawyers for both Brady and the accomplice testified.132 The district
court denied the petition on the ground that Brady chose to plead
guilty because of his accomplices defection, not the risk of capital
punishment, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.133
In the companion case of Parker v. North Carolina, Parker was
charged in 1964 with first-degree burglary as the alleged perpetra-
tor of a home invasion and rape.134 The North Carolina statute, like
125. Text taken from United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 570-71 (1968).
126. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743.
127. Id. at 743-44.
128. Id. at 744.
129. United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn. 1967), aff d in part and
revd in part, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
130. Brady, 397 U.S. at 744.
131. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591.
132. Brady v. United States, 404 F.2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1968), aff d, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
133. Id. It is clear that Brady filed his habeas petition after the district court decision in
Jackson, and that the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Bradys petition after the Supreme
Court decision in Jackson. It is not clear from the reports whether the district court decision
in Brady preceded or followed the Supreme Courts decision in Jackson.
134. 397 U.S. 790, 791-92 (1970).
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the Federal Kidnapping Act, authorized the death penalty for first-
degree burglary but only at the discretion of a trial jury; a guilty
plea led to an automatic sentence of life imprisonment.135 Parker
pleaded guilty but three years later challenged his conviction in the
state courts, which rejected his plea for postconviction relief.136
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in both Brady and
Parker.137 Despite the factual finding below that Brady was not mo-
tivated by fear of the death penalty when he entered his plea, the
Court took the occasion to announce a broad approval of plea
bargaining in general:
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substan-
tial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that
he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the
correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for
success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than
might otherwise be necessary.138
Parkers plea was pretty clearly motivated by fear of the death
sentence, but given the breadth of the opinion in Brady, the Court
rejected Parkers coercion claim with little more than a reference to
Brady.139
The Brady Court acknowledged both the analogy to police interro-
gation and plea bargainings potential risk to the innocent.140 With
respect to the former, the Brady opinion distinguished police in-
terrogation from plea bargaining by invoking Miranda.141 If the
135. Id. at 795 n.6 (The statute authorizing guilty pleas to capital charges was repealed,
effective March 25, 1969. As a result of the repeal, a person who is charged with a capital
offense and who is not allowed to plead to a lesser charge must apparently face a jury trial
and a death penalty upon a verdict of guilty unless the jury recommends life imprisonment.)
(citations omitted).
136. Id. at 793-94.
137. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 742; Parker, 397 U.S. at 790.
138. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753.
139. See Parker, 397 U.S. at 795 ([W]e determined in Brady v. United States that an
otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by the defendants desire to limit the
possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial. In this respect
we see nothing to distinguish Parkers case from Bradys.) (citation omitted).
140. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754, 757-58.
141. The Court rejected Bradys reliance on Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 565
(1897) (holding an admission made during police interrogation inadmissible under both the
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presence of counsel dispels coercion, Brady was in fact represented
by competent counsel.142 So too with the innocence problem; the
Court declared its trust in the advice of counsel, the skepticism of
trial judges receiving pleas, and the option of trial with all its safe-
guards.143
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas dissented in Parker but
concurred in Brady.144 Justice Brennan concluded that the North
Carolina capital punishment scheme was unconstitutional under
Jackson (indeed, worse, inasmuch as under the Federal Kidnapping
Act a defendant could preclude the death penalty by waiving jury
but not trial).145 It followed that Parkers case should be remanded
and the conviction set aside if he can demonstrate that the uncon-
stitutional capital punishment scheme was a significant factor in his
decision to plead guilty.146 Because the lower courts previously
determined that the risk of capital punishment had not been a
involuntary confession doctrine and the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege) by
citing Miranda. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754 (But Bram and its progeny did not hold that the
possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and
advice of counsel, any more than Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that the
possibly coercive atmosphere of the police station could not be counteracted by the presence
of counsel or other safeguards.).
142. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754-55 (Bradys situation bears no resemblance to Brams.
Brady first pleaded not guilty; prior to changing his plea to guilty he was subjected to no
threats or promises in face-to-face encounters with the authorities. He had competent counsel
and full opportunity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with
those attending a plea of guilty; there was no hazard of an impulsive and improvident re-
sponse to a seeming but unreal advantage. His plea of guilty was entered in open court and
before a judge obviously sensitive to the requirements of the law with respect to guilty pleas.
Bradys plea, unlike Brams confession, was voluntary.).
143. See id. at 757-58 (This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for
the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are
necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials
to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results,
and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. We would have
serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency sub-
stantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would
falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations
that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made
by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to ques-
tion the accuracy and reliability of the defendants admissions that they committed the crimes
with which they are charged. In the case before us, nothing in the record impeaches Bradys
plea or suggests that his admissions in open court were anything but the truth.).
144. See Parker, 397 U.S. at 790, 799 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. See id. at 812-13.
146. Id. at 813.
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significant factor in Bradys decision to plead guilty, the Parker
dissenters concurred in the judgment in Brady.147
Neither Brady nor Parker had maintained innocence while evinc-
ing a willingness to plead guilty. In North Carolina v. Alford, Alford
was charged with first-degree murder under the same statutory
scheme in Parker: a guilty plea precluded the death penalty.148
Before accepting Alfords guilty plea to second-degree murder and
imposing a sentence of thirty years, the trial court judge held a
hearing.149 A police officer and two other witnesses testified that, in
sum, Alford had declared his intention to kill the victim, gone to
fetch his gun, and later announced that he had killed the de-
ceased.150
Unlike Parker or Brady, at the plea colloquy Alford gave tes-
timony maintaining his innocence and stating that he was pleading
guilty only to avoid the gas chamber.151 Alford challenged his convic-
tion through postconviction petitions, which were denied until the
Supreme Courts 1968 decision in Jackson impugned the constitu-
tionality of North Carolinas no trial, no death penalty arrange-
ment.152 After Jackson, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the plea involuntary because it was substantially motivated by the
threat of the death penalty.153 The Supreme Court reversed.154
Justice Whites majority opinion focused on Alfords protestation
of innocence, a fact that distinguished his case from Parkers, but
this did not persuade the Court of a constitutional distinction:
Here the State had a strong case of first-degree murder against
Alford. Whether he realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted
on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain
by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the over-
whelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what
147. See id. at 815-16.
148. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
149. Id. at 28.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 28 n.2 (I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too
much evidence, but I aint shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never had
an argument in our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didnt they would gas
me for it, and that is all.).
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 31.
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neither Alford nor his attorney desired. Confronted with the
choice between a trial for first-degree murder, on the one hand,
and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other,
Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the
maximum penalty to a 30-year term.155
In other words, even if Alfords assertion of innocence were true, he
should still be allowed to accept a deal to his advantage.
This result has strong practical support. If the announced rule
was that a claim of innocence precluded entry of the advantageous
plea, defendants desiring the deal would not assert innocence.
Against the background assumption that the only two choices are
the proposed guilty plea or trial of the prosecutors higher charges
according to the general rules of evidence and procedure, the result
in Alford makes sense. What does not make sense, and what Alford
says nothing about, is the background assumption.
Brady and Parker pleaded guilty and then sought to undo their
pleas after the substantive law had changed in their favor.156 Alford
pleaded guilty under protest but did not offer the trial court any
third option other than a capital trial on the first-degree charge or
a guilty plea to the second-degree charge.157 None of them proposed
to stand trial on lesser charges or even on the capital charge pro-
vided that special procedural safeguards were followed at that trial.
Alfords sentence after the plea was thirty years;158 what if, for
example, he had offered to stand trial at risk of a life sentence on
conviction? Or if he offered to stand trial on the capital charge,
provided his criminal history could not be put in evidence, whether
for purposes of proving intent or of impeaching his testimony? The
cases do not resolve these issues because the defendants did not
raise them.
155. Id. at 37.
156. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
158. Alford, 400 U.S. at 29.
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B. Bordenkircher v. Hayes
A Kentucky grand jury indicted Paul Lewis Hayes for uttering a
forged instrument for $88.30.159 The alleged offense was a felony
carrying a two- to ten-year prison term on conviction.160 Hayes,
however, had twice before been found guilty of felony offenses.161
The prosecutor offered to recommend a five-year sentence if Hayes
pleaded guilty but coupled this proposal with another, more men-
acing, one.162 If Hayes refused to plead out, the State would file a
superseding indictment adding a recidivism charge carrying man-
datory life sentence on conviction.163
Hayes nonetheless elected to face trial, lost at trial, and then
challenged the conviction on the Habitual Criminal Act as a vio-
lation of due process.164 Hayes relied heavily on North Carolina v.
Pearce165 and Blackledge v. Perry.166 In Pearce, defendants who suc-
ceeded in postconviction challenges to their convictions were
remanded for new trials that resulted in convictions.167 The trial
courts on remand imposed substantially more severe sentences than
those imposed after the initial convictions.168 The Supreme Court
held that the higher sentences violated due process if their purpose
was to punish the defendants for successfully pursuing their legal
postconviction remedies and that a presumption of vindictiveness
attached to the higher sentences.169 A good explanation, unrelated
to the successful postconviction proceedings, was required to dispel
the presumption.170
In Perry, the defendant was a prisoner involved in a fight with
another inmate.171 Perry, the defendant, was initially charged with
a misdemeanor in state district court, convicted, and sentenced to
159. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 359.
162. See id. at 358-59.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 359-60.
165. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
166. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
167. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-14.
168. Id. at 713-14, 713 n.1.
169. Id. at 725.
170. Id. at 726.
171. Perry, 417 U.S. at 22.
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six months to be served consecutively with his ongoing sentence.172
Under North Carolina law, a defendant convicted in the district
court had an unqualified right to a trial de novo in the superior
court.173 Perry appealed to the superior court, and the prosecution
responded by filing a felony charge in that court.174 Perry took the
hint, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to seven years, this time
concurrent with his ongoing sentence but still resulting in an ex-
tension of his period of incarceration relative to the misdemeanor
conviction.175 The Supreme Court held that the more serious charge
brought by the prosecutor at the trial de novo stage effectively pun-
ished Perry for a lawful appeal and, absent some explanation such
as newly discovered evidence, violated due process.176
Justice Stewart, writing for the five-Justice majority in
Bordenkircher, rejected the analogy to post-reversal-of-conviction
enhancements that were at issue in Pearce and Perry: [I]n the give-
and-take of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punish-
ment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject
the prosecutions offer.177 The majority saw no way to set a baseline
to distinguish threats from promises:
Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining
necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is
involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end
result of the bargaining process. By hypothesis, the plea may
have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient
sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the pos-
sibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial.178
As for the innocent, [d]efendants advised by competent counsel and
protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable
of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and un-
likely to be driven to false self-condemnation.179
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 22-23.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 28-29, 29 n.7.
177. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
178. Id. (citations omitted).
179. Id.
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes does not stand for the proposition that
a plea entered to avoid a catastrophic increase in the charges the
prosecutor proposes to file if the accused refuses to plead guilty is
not coerced. Bordenkircher is not a coercion case; it is a vindictive-
ness case. Hayes did not claim that he was forced to plead guilty for
the (blindingly) obvious reason that he did not plead guilty. He
could not represent that any reasonable person in his position would
have pleaded guilty, having not pleaded guilty himself. He chose to
run the risk of trial, on the terms set by the prosecutor, and then,
having lost his gamble, sought to reduce the trial penalty to zero by
having the recidivism conviction set aside as retaliatory.
Hayes vindictiveness claim prevailed in the Sixth Circuit and fell
one vote short in the Supreme Court.180 But had it succeeded, it
would have altered plea bargaining very little. As all three of the
opinions in the Supreme Court decision admitted, prosecutors would
have responded by overcharging first, thereby converting the threat
into an offer.181 Neither of the two dissenting opinions proposed to
regulate that practice judicially.
The distinction between vindictiveness and coercion is initially
hard to see because at first glance throwing out retaliatory charges
after trial convictions seems like the only way to remedy coercive
pretrial threats. Those who really are coerced into pleading guilty
want to plead guilty rather than stand trial on terms set by the
prosecutor. A true coercion claim could arise only pretrial, before the
state has gone to the expense of trial and before the defendant has
actually gone through the dispositive allocution.
We will explore how this might be done procedurally in the next
Section. Here, let it be said that a defendant who accepted a bar-
gain rather than risk a catastrophic trial penalty, but then asked
the court to set the case for trial at the hazard of a lesser but sub-
stantial trial penalty, would be raising a very differentand
potentially more momentousconstitutional claim than the vin-
dictiveness claim the Court rejected in Bordenkircher.
The second point to be made about Bordenkircher is just how
much prosecutorial power has grown in the last forty years. The life
sentence imposed on Hayes left him eligible for parole after fifteen
180. See id. at 357, 365.
181. See id. at 360-61, 368, 371-72.
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years.182 Presumably, the prosecutors proposed plea sentence of five
years would have been subject to a parallel parole discount, but al-
lowing for that, the practical trial penalty looked to be significantly
less than fifteen years. In stark contrast, the additional § 924(c)
charges in Angelos added a mandatory trial penalty of fifty-five
years to be served consecutively.183
Finally, a central premise of the majority opinion in Bordenkir-
cher was that a rational innocent defendant, advised by counsel and
aware of the procedural safeguards of the trial process, would likely
not be driven to false self-condemnation.184 Today we have strong
evidence that modern plea incentives do indeed drive defendants to
false self-condemnation.185 Whatever the statistics on innocent
guilty pleas may be, an individual defendant who claims innocence
yet wants to plead guilty only if the court refuses to set the case for
trial, risking a lesser trial penalty than the prosecution offers, ex-
pressly asserts rational preference for false self-condemnation.
Bordenkircher has no application to such a case.
C. Summary of the Legal Argument
A long line of Supreme Court precedents condemns coerced con-
fessions as violations of due process. If catastrophic trial penalties
are distinguishable, it is not because of the degree of behavioral
pressure. Instead, it must be that trial penalties, unlike beatings,
sleep deprivation, and truth serums, comport with the moral and
legal baselines for assessing coercion.
Yet this cannot be because the prosecutor has statutory discretion
to bring both the low and the high charges. Statutory authorization
would not make beatings, sleep deprivation, or truth serums con-
stitutional methods of interrogation. Nor can it be that the accused
consults counsel before pleading guilty, any more than the presence
of counsel during beatings, sleep deprivation, or drugging would
make those methods of interrogation constitutional.
182. Id. at 370 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting) (It is suggested that respondent will be eligible
for parole consideration after serving 15 years.).
183. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d. 1227, 1232 (D. Utah 2004).
184. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
185. See supra Part I.C.2.
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The narrowest version of the due process voluntariness test for
confessions is the strand incorporating the common-law evidence
rule against threats or promises. The due process confessions doc-
trine is more capacious, but that is its irreducible core. It follows
that while the prosecutor has a statutory right to bring the low or
the high charge, her statutory right ends when the gap between the
plea charges and the trial charges would induce an innocent person
to plead guilty. The accused, guilty or innocent, has a constitutional
right to a reliable determination of guilt and innocence. Catastroph-
ic trial penalties violate that right.
None of the Supreme Courts plea bargaining cases hold other-
wise. Each of them recognizes the applicability of the confessions
cases; each of them emphasizes the reliability of the guilty pleas at
issue. None of them arose after a defendant challenged a plea deal
as potentially coercive of the innocent.
The obvious problem in Alford is remedial. If a defendant really
is coerced into pleading guilty, the defendant is better off taking the
deal than standing trial on the prosecutors terms. So long as those
terms are the only ones available, defendants will take the deal
even if it requires false admissions of guilt. We turn now to consider
what sort of alternative remedial structure might preclude trial pen-
alties that are coercive by the innocence baseline criterion.
IV. DEFENSE TRIAL OFFERS
If the legal theory set out in Part III is sound, the trial penalty is
unconstitutional when it would drive a rational innocent person to
plead guilty. This calculation involves: (1) the difference between
the likely sentence on the plea and the likely sentence on a convic-
tion after trial; and (2) the risk that the trial would result in an
erroneous conviction. Devising an appropriate remedial scheme is
challenging but not impossible.
The Supreme Court cases show an interesting pattern. Brady
and Parker pleaded guilty without claiming innocence when their
pleas were entered.186 Hayes did not plead guilty, stood trial on the
186. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 792-93 (1970).
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prosecutors terms, and lost.187 Alford claimed innocence but pleaded
out rather than stand trial.188 None of the defendants claimed at the
plea hearing to be faced with a coercive trial penalty and to be will-
ing to stand trial on terms other than those set by the prosecution.
On terms other than those set by the prosecution? What other
terms could there be? But if the court accepted the defense claim
that the trial penalty is unconstitutional as judged by the rational
innocence baseline, some combination of lower charges or special
trial procedures likely exists that is not coercive by the rational in-
nocence standard. The issue is: What is the maximum constitutional
trial penalty?
Because the answer to that question is a function of the sentenc-
ing differential and the risk of erroneous trial conviction, the court
could remedy an unconstitutional trial penalty by dismissing some
of the trial charges, and/or ordering special, this-case-only trial pro-
cedures, then setting the case for trial. To see what such an order
might look like, we need to be more specific about the showing re-
quired before finding the trial penalty coercive by the rational
innocence standard.
A. The Initial Showing of Coercion
We can begin our search for an appropriate remedy for coercive
plea offers by returning to the analogy between guilty pleas and con-
fessions. A suspect who confesses to the police under third-degree
pressures does not waive the right to complain of subsequent coer-
cion. He can move to suppress his confession before trial. By parallel
reasoning, a defendant may not validly waive the right to complain
about coercive plea pressures.
A procedural parallel to the motion to suppress a confession
would be a trial offer motion. An accused confronted by a coercive
prosecutorial charge differential should do what a suspect being
beaten by the police should doacquiesce until a complaint can be
made in court. In the plea context, this means memorializing the
prosecutions last, best offer and then moving the court either to en-
ter the agreed-upon plea (minus any acceptance of responsibility
187. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 359-60.
188. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970).
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discount) or to set the case for trial on lesser charges than those
threatened by the prosecutor if the defense insists on trial.
Appropriating the narrowest version of the coerced-confession
standard, the defense would need to show that a rational innocent
person would be likely to plead guilty given the choice presented
by the prosecution. A rational innocent defendant would weigh the
costs of the trial process, plus the expected trial sentence, dis-
counted by the probability that the trial would end in an acquittal,
against the expected plea sentence. This calculation turns out to be
complicated and imprecise; many key variables can be estimated
only by informed guesswork.
Even estimating the actual difference between the plea sentence
and the potential trial sentence can be difficult. Consider Bordenkir-
cher, in which the five-year plea sentence offered was only half the
statutory maximum for the charged crime,189 and the life sentence
imposed at trial was subject to eligibility for parole after fifteen
years.190 Mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines
have made expected sentences more determinate. Moreover, just as
with determining the voluntariness of a plea today, the question
would be whether the accused understands any uncertainties about
the potential sentence. If, given those uncertainties, a rational inno-
cent person would plead guilty, the proposed test would be satisfied.
Factoring in the characteristics of the particular defendant is
more problematic. Consider one defendant who is sixty and anoth-
er who is sixteen. The older defendant may see little difference
between a twenty-year and a forty-year sentence, while the sixteen-
year-old would take a different view. However, the teenager might
rationally expect to be raped in prison. A defendant who already
has a criminal record may stand to lose little from collateral conse-
quences and care only about the expected time served. Another de-
fendant might face the permanent loss of a good career from a
felony conviction, even if no prison time is imposed. Even a misde-
meanor charge that might trigger classification as a registered sex
offender threatens potentially catastrophic consequences.
189. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358 (explaining that Hayess crime was punishable by a
maximum prison term of ten years, but the guilty plea offered a sentence of five years).
190. Id. at 370 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Estimating the risk that the trial process will end in an erroneous
conviction is also difficult. In a sophisticated statistical study, Bruce
Spencer estimated the probability that juries would erroneously
convict as 0.25 (for judges the figure was an eye-opening 0.37),
whereas the corresponding probabilities for erroneous acquittals
were 0.14 for juries and 0.02 for judges.191 These estimates are
subject to significant methodological reservations.192 After reviewing
Spencers work and the work of others, Samuel Gross gives a sensi-
ble but unsatisfying assessment: [J]udging from these studies (and
a wealth of anecdotal evidence), an innocent defendant who goes to
trial facing the most extreme penalties availabledeath, life im-
prisonment, or decades of incarcerationstands an unknown but
substantial risk of a false conviction.193
If quantifying the risk of false conviction remains elusive, the
types of cases running the greatest risk are now well known. Just
as the confession cases developed so-called hallmarks of coercion,
the exoneration cases have revealed hallmarks of potential miscar-
riages.194 Some of these should be apparent without either a mini-
trial or any invasion of attorney-client privilege. If the prosecutions
case turns on eyewitness identification, testimony by a compensated
informant, or a confession by a juvenile or mentally handicapped
person, the exoneration cases suggest that the risk of trial error is
higher than normal.195 The empirical evidence also indicates that
when the accused has a felony record, juries are prone to draw
irrational inferences of guilt from either the defendants failure to
testify or the admission of the prior conviction to impeach his testi-
mony if he elects to testify.196
191. Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 305, 327 (2007).
192. See Paula Hannaford-Agor, On Second Guessing Jury Verdicts, VOIRDIRE, Fall/Winter
2007, at 5.
193. Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal
Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (2012).
194. For example, the Innocence Project analyzed the first 325 DNA exonerations and
found that misidentifications contributed to 72 percent, faulty forensic science to 47 percent,
false confessions to 27 percent, and informants to 15 percent. The Causes of Wrongful Con-
viction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction
[https://perma.cc/ADT5-KBUG] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
195. See id.
196. See generally John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior
RecordLessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477 (2008).
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Adapting the confessions test to the plea process yields the fol-
lowing standard: if the defense can show that in the totality of the
circumstances the potential trial sentence threatens catastrophic
consequences, such that the risk of conviction at trial might induce
a reasonable, innocent person to plead guilty, the plea has been co-
erced in violation of due process.
Absent from the test is any showing that the particular accused
is factually innocent, beyond an assertion incompatible with any
acceptance of responsibility benefit at sentencing. Leaving the
presumption of innocence aside, the practical problems with holding
mini-trials to determine whether to have actual trials are disposi-
tive. To the extent that special hallmarks of potential jury error,
such as reliance on eye witnesses, are obvious from the charge itself,
their presence should be considered as increasing the risk that an
innocent person would plead guilty. Further inquiry into the facts
of the case would be costly and potentially in conflict with both dis-
covery rules and evidentiary privileges.
The proposed test is certainly a standard rather than a rule. It
leaves considerable room for judicial discretion. In principle, how-
ever, it is a demanding standard. Consider Bordenkircher, in which
the expected trial penalty was ten years to life.197 Accepting ar-
guendo Spencers 0.25 probability of false conviction estimate, the
fifteen-year sentence discounted by the probability of acquittal at
trial is 3.75 yearsless than the five year maximum on the plea
charge. At the high end of the spectrum things change. If the real
meaning of life was forty years, then the expected outcome of
standing trial would be ten yearsdouble the five-year maximum
on the plea charge.
B. Trial Offers
Remedying coercion poses a difficult challenge. The coerced party
will deny the coercion so long as the coercive pressure is still in ef-
fect. In the plea context, even the factually innocent defendant
wants the deal when confronted with the prospect of catastrophic
penalties after an unpromising trial. Moreover, because the plea/
trial gap exerts the pressure to plead guilty when innocent, coercion
197. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978).
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can be eliminated by raising the floor rather than lowering the
ceiling. If the prosecution responds to a complaint of coercion by
increasing the severity of the charges in the plea offer, the defen-
dant will likely be worse off than if no complaint was made.
These obstacles are serious, and the problem of rational innocents
pleading guilty may only be redressed by systemic reforms of sen-
tencing severity and trial penalties. However, a legal procedure
could be devised that permits an accused who claims innocence to
raise a claim of coercion without any broader reform. A tentative
proposal follows.
Substantively, a trial offer motion would have two components.
The first is a showing that the trial/plea sentencing differential is
coercive from the baseline of the rational innocent person. The se-
cond is a request to the court to set the case for trial on different
terms than those threatened by the prosecution. Therefore, the
motion cannot be made until the plea/trial differential is known
with reasonable certainty.
Procedurally, the most direct approach would be to enter the plea
but then move to withdraw it, provided that the court accepts the
defense proposal for trial. Unconstitutional coercion surely counts
as a fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea.198 If the court
rejects the coercion claim the case would simply proceed to sentenc-
ing, with the defense having lost the acceptance of responsibility
benefit. If the court agrees that the plea/trial differential was co-
ercive, it would then proceed to determine terms of trial.
The range of alternatives is rich because the defense is wielding
a constitutional sword but is free to waive all rights other than the
right against coercion itself. The most obvious alternative is a trial
on charges less serious than those threatened by the prosecution.
For example, in the Angelos case the defense might have asked the
court to set the case for trial on the drug charges plus one, and only
one, § 924(c) count.
198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d):
Withdrawing a Guilty or Nolo Contendere Plea. A defendant may withdraw a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
(1) before the court accepts the plea, for any reason or no reason; or
(2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if:
(A) the court rejects a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5); or
(B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.
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The range of options is not confined to modifications of the
charges to be tried or the consequences attached to those charges.
As recent and interesting work by Greg Gilchrist and by John
Rappaport points out, the defense might agree to make trial less
costly by waiving particular rights attached to traditional trials.199
If the prosecutions concern is the cost of jury selection or witness
time or safety, the defense might offer to try the case to the court
and/or to waive the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.200
Moreover, the defense might claim that the trial threat is coercive
because of procedures that raise the risk of false conviction in the
particular case. A defendant with a felony record facing a vulner-
able prosecution case might reasonably apprehend that whether he
chooses to testify and be impeached with his record, or stand silent
and have the jury judge accordingly, his chances at trial are too slim
to risk conviction on the trial charges. Here, the defense might claim
coercion and propose trial, even on the prosecutions trial charges,
subject to a constitutional ruling excluding the prior convictions.
C. Prosecution Responses
The prosecution understandably would argue that the constitu-
tional standard of coercion proposed here is precluded by precedent,
and in due course that claim would be heard on appeal. I have
addressed the precedents earlier,201 and if my case for the legal
equivalence of coerced confessions and trial penalties that threaten
innocence is well-taken, the appellate courts would approve the
basic procedure. The prosecution would need to fall back on other
positions.
The troubling prospect is that the anti-coercion principle applies
to the gap between the plea and the trial charges, which can be
narrowed by reducing the trial charges or by increasing the plea
charges. If the prosecution were permitted to close the gap in this
199. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 614 (2016) (advocating
[t]rial bargaining ... where the defendant waives only limited trial rights, thus preserving a
trial that is shorter, cheaper, less uncertain, or some combination thereof, in exchange for
limited leniency); John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 182 (2015) (challenging the assumption that plea bargaining occurs within an all-or-
nothing framework).
200. See Gilchrist, supra note 199, at 623.
201. See supra Part III.
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way, by revoking or modifying the plea offer, the present system
would be little changed. Defense counsel contemplating a trial offer
would know that it would be the functional equivalent of electing
the very trial option deemed catastrophic in the first place. The sys-
tem that now pressures rational innocent people to plead guilty
would go on undisturbed.
To remedy unconstitutional coercion, the trial offer needs to be
immune from retaliatory charging. This can be done in different
ways. If the offer is made as part of a motion to withdraw a plea, the
proposed order itself would bar the prosecution from filing addition-
al charges, other than those contemplated by the trial order itself,
in the instant matter. The defense should have the benefit of the
original agreement; otherwise, the prospect of renewed overcharging
would practically defeat the constitutional right against coercion.
Alternatively, retaliatory charging could be barred by vindictive-
ness doctrine rather than by coercion doctrine. In United States v.
Goodwin, a case following Bordenkircher, the Court considered
whether the Due Process Clause prohibited a prosecutor from bring-
ing more serious charges after a defendant invoked his right to a
jury trial rather than electing to plead guilty.202 Goodwin distin-
guished Blackledge and Pearce by drawing a distinction between
pretrial charging increases and those that follow reversal on ap-
peal.203 In the latter, but not the former, context, vindictiveness is
presumed.204 Adding charges pretrial, however, is indistinguishable
from charging high in the first place and then subtracting later.
Both are equally part of the give and take of plea bargaining.
The Goodwin line of cases dealing with prosecutorial vindictive-
ness might be better understood as a preplea bargaining/postplea
bargaining line rather than as a pretrial/posttrial line. Goodwin is
rightly indifferent to the precise time at which the charges con-
stituting the trial penalty are formally filed. However, a trial
penalty is categorically different from a coercion-challenge penalty.
If we accept the existence of a constitutional coercion limit on plea
offers, any practical remedy requires freezing the floor of the
prosecutions offer and reducing the gap by bringing down the
202. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 382-83 (1982).
203. See id. at 383.
204. See id.
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ceiling. The advantage of raising the coercion claim by motion to
withdraw a plea is that we can say with certainty that plea
bargaining at that point has ended.
The parties would be free to settle the case without trial if they
reach an agreement framed by the baseline of presumed innocence.
If the court rejects the defendants trial offer, the defendant would
follow through on the plea but forfeit acceptance-of-responsibility
sentencing reductions and appeal the denial of the trial offer. If the
court grants the defense motion, the prosecution could either try the
case or make an offer that comes down from the baseline set by the
trial order. If trial offers became granted regularly, we might see the
procedure become a vehicle for reducing the overpunishment prob-
lem.
Would the prospect of defense trial offers induce an across-the-
board decrease in trial penalties by increases in the plea floor rather
by decreases in the trial ceiling? The anti-coercion principle would
not be offended by such a dynamic. Closing the gap by a general ex
ante increase in the severity of plea charges, however, seems unlike-
ly given that few defendants are likely to make trial offer motions.
Those who do are certain to lose the acceptance-of-responsibility
discount, and they do not know whether the trial court will grant
the motion or, if the motion is granted, what terms will be set for
a trial. In any event, narrowing the gap across the board would
encourage trials across the board. It seems improbable that prose-
cutors, let alone judges or legislators, would find that attractive.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the law needs to break the prosecutors functional mo-
nopoly on both the right to plead guilty and the right to stand trial.
The two projects require different legal reforms, and at least ini-
tially there may be some tension between them. In a prior paper I
suggested a procedure for offering spontaneous guilty pleas, without
the consent of the prosecution, as a remedy for overcharging.205 The
205. Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining, in THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW 55,
71 (Robina Inst. of Criminal L. & Criminal Justice, 2014), http://www.robinainstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/Future-of-Criminal-Law_Working-PapersFULL-TEXT.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PQM6-RW3P].
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argument presented here addresses plea bargainings innocence
problem.
If we must pick one place or the other to start, it seems reason-
able to favor those who claim innocence at the risk of a substantial
trial penalty over those who admit guilt and seek only to reduce its
consequences. If charging decisions became generally more punitive
in response, this would add to the urgency for reforms directed at
enabling the entry of guilty pleas over the objection of the prosecu-
tion.
I propose specific reforms largely to stimulate further thought on
how to regulate prosecutorial charge selection. Of course, any move-
ment in that direction depends on the exercise of political will from
either the legislative or the judicial branch. On that front, I can only
hope to encourage new thinking by exposing the moral equivalence
between the interrogation tactics our law condemns as odious and
the plea bargaining tactics it tolerates as commonplace.

